Imagine 10,000 people, 1% of whom have a disease: 100 sick and 9,900 healthy. A test catches 90% of sick people, so 90 of the 100 test positive. It also wrongly flags 5% of healthy people, which is 495 of the 9,900. In total 585 people test positive, and only 90 of them are sick. So the chance that a person with a positive result is sick is 58590≈15%.
That count is Bayes' theorem in disguise. The numerator, 90, is P(+∣D)⋅P(D) scaled up to 10,000 people: the true positives. The denominator, 585, is P(+): every way a positive can happen, true or false. The prior P(D)=0.01 matters because it decides how large the healthy group is, and a small error rate applied to a huge group produces many false alarms.
Bayes is for flipping a conditional. If a table already gives the joint counts, such as 90 sick people among 585 positives, you can read P(D∣+) straight off as an ordinary conditional probability; nothing needs flipping. You need Bayes when you are handed the conditional in the other direction (how the test behaves given the disease) together with how common the disease is.
Think of it like this. Bayes works like a detective weighing suspects. Before any clue, some suspects are more likely than others: the prior. A clue such as muddy boots fits some suspects better than others: the likelihood. Multiply the two for each suspect and rescale so the chances add to 1. A clue that fits a rare suspect perfectly can still point to a common suspect it fits less well.
Core idea. Bayes' theorem flips a conditional, turning P(E∣H) and a prior P(H) into the posterior P(H∣E).